

2

THE
HISTORY
OF THE
UNITED PROVINCES
OF
ACHAIA.

Collected in Latine by the Learned
JACOBUS GOTHOFREDUS,
And rendred into *English*, with some Additions,
By **HENRY STUBBE.**



L O N D O N :

Printed by *Andrew Clark* for *Jonathan Edwin*, at the *Three
Roses* in *Ludgate-street*. 1 6 7 3.

Y R O T S I H

A I A I A

London and other cities
of the world
and the
S. 1881

London and other cities
of the world

TO THE
READER.

THE late Revolutions in the United Netherlands brought into my memory the Republick of Achaia; this being the Original from whence the Dutch framed their Common-wealth. Upon this account I retain in the Translation those terms of State-holder, and States-General, &c. The subject was thought heretofore so considerable as to employ the Pens of Polybius and Jac. Gothofredus: and I believe the Reader may find

as much of delight and benefit in
the perusal of the ensuing Trea-
tise, as of most Pamphlets which
are obtruded on the world each
Term.

TO

THE
HISTORY
OF THE
UNITED PROVINCES
OF
ACHAIA.

THE Peninsula of *Peloponnesus* (now called *Morea*) was at first ruled by certain *Kings*, until the Sons of *Ogyus* came to the Government; they happening to practise such a *tyranny* as rendered them insupportable to their Subjects, several of the Cities determined to free themselves, and associate into one *Republick*: thus twelve of them united into one *Democracy*. This *Union* continued until the times of *Philip* of *Macedon*, and his Son *Alexander*: then the puissance of *Macedonia* growing great and terrible, this *Union* began to dissolve, the *Macedonians* by sundry artifices sowing divisions betwixt the *Cities*; whereupon some of them submitted to the prevailing *Macedonians*, others fell under the dominion of sundry *Tyrants*. But they were soon sensible of the miseries which *their dissensions* had brought upon *them*, and the departure of *Pyrrhus* into *Italy* having given *them* an opportunity to revolt, they ejected the several

The History of the

veral Tyrants, and re-established their *Liberty*, and *Ten* of them formed such a *Republick*, with so great *Unanimity* and *Friendship*, that nothing could seem more *firm*, or better *regulated*. Though their *Cities* were separate, yet they had but *one Government*, and each did heartily contribute to the support of the rest. They were renowned for their *Great Justice* and *Moderation*; several Commonwealths borrowed from them the *Model* of their Government; and upon emergent Controversies, their Neighbours would remit the decision thereof unto the *Acheans*: not by reason of their *Great Power*, (for they were hardly considerable thereupon amongst the *Greeks*) but for their singular *Justice* and *Probity*, the which procured them an universal *Reverence*, and made others desirous to contract Amity with a People famed for all those Vertues which beget *Esteem*, but not *Terrour*, in their Neighbours. There was a perfect *Equality* betwixt all the *United Cities*; all were equally capable of *Honours* and *Employments* in the *State*: They sought not to enlarge *their Territories*, by the oppression of *their Neighbours*: The Aids they gave at any time, were *un-interested*; and all the Advantages they derived *thence*, was, to have relieved the *Distressed*, and to have restored the *General Peace*. These *Maxims* made several upon sundry occasions to seek *Their Friendship*, as the *Kings* of *Macedon*, *Pergamus*, *Egypt*, and *Syria*; and at length the *Romans* courted them into a *Confederacy*, which proved in the issue destructive to their *Republick*.

The *Principal Authority* at first was fixed in *Two Captains* and a *Secretary of State*; But after some time, they thought it more expedient for the Administration of Affairs, that the *Executive Power* should be lodged in one *State-holder* or *General*, whom they termed *Strategus*, who was chosen indifferently from out of any of the *Cities*, according to his *Extraordinary Worth*; and his Government continued but *one year*, unless it were anew confirmed unto him. They held a *General Assembly* of the *States* twice each year, in the *Spring* and *Autumn*, at a certain place in
the

the middle of their Territories called *Ægium*, the most populous and rich of all the *Confederate* Cities: The *States* assembled in a certain *Grove* dedicated to *Jupiter*; all matters appertaining to War and Peace, all Laws and Alliances were dispatched there; the *State-holder*, with *Ten Adseßors* (called *Demiurgi*) presiding therein.

Amongst *their Laws*, these, not to name others, were esteemed to be very prudential. *That no Assembly should continue above three days, but the States should come to their final Resolution within that time:* Whereby all long Debates and Quarrels were prevented, and all opportunities cut off whereby their Counsels might be retarded, or Factions introduced. Another was, *That no Foreign Ambassador could have Audience in the States, without communicating his Message first, to the end that the States might know wherefore they were assembled.* Whereby they secured themselves against all such Projects as might tend to the overthrow of the State, and had time to weigh things maturely and dispassionately before the Session. Also, *That none of the United Cities should send abroad any Publick Embassies, but with the participation of the rest.* They did think it fundamental to their preservation, that all things should be managed by *Joynt Consent*, and no room be left for *separate Counsels*: That all the *Cities* should have the *same Alliances*, and move by the *same Maxims*. So tender were they of *this Law*, that they expressly provided for it in their Treaties with the *Romans*; cautioning that the *Romans* should not make any Addresses to any of *their Cities* privately, but to the *Publick*: And the Authority of the Republick seemed ruined, when *Appius Claudius* did by his Artifices prevail with the *Lacedemonians* to give him a private and *separate Audience*: whence arose *Dissentions* betwixt the *Confederates*, and many began to pursue their *proper Interests* and *Respects*, to the overthrow of the Republick. Against *Bribes* they had this most Renowned Constitution, *That none should receive any Gifts or Pensions from any Foreign Prince.* And this was so rigorously observed, and such a sense imprint-
ed

The History of the

ed in the *Achæans* thereof, that when King *Eumenes* offered them *one hundred and twenty Talents*, with the Interest whercof, the charges of such as came to the *General Assembly* should be defrayed; they *generously* refused it, and were inclined to renounce all *Amity* with him, for making such an Overture. *Apollonius* the *Sicyonian* thus argued against the Proposition: *The money which is frankly offered by the King of Pergamus, is so considerable in it self, that it may deserve the Regards of the Achæan Republick; but if we look upon the Intention of the Donor, to accept thereof is Bribery and Corruption repugnant to the Law: Single Persons were prohibited to take any Bribe or Present, and should the Whole Republick at once make it self obnoxious? It would be a perpetual shame, and most ignominious to be said, That the States General of Achaia were maintained by the King of Pergamus; and that the Councils of the United Cities were managed by such as eat the Bread of a Foreign Potentate. If this President were admitted of, others would imitate his Example, and the Liberty of the Republick would be exposed to sale. That Controversies were apt to arise betwixt States, and their Ends and Interests might in time prove opposite to those of the Republick: If such Donatives and Presents as these were tolerated, the Achæans would infallibly run into this perplexity sooner or later, either to be ungrateful to their Benefactors, or of betraying their proper Liberties and Interests, to avoid that Imputation. In fine, there was nothing of advantage in present, that could countervail the fatal Inconveniencies which would ensue thereon.*

By these and such-like Constitutions the *Achæans* preserved their Republick in a flourishing condition: and although their *Union* drew upon them the *Envy* and *Hatred* of their Neighbours, yet did they support themselves against the Attempts of the *Ætolians*, *Lacedemonians*, *Eleans*, and *Macedonians*, which Nations, either *separately*, or in *conjunction*, did make War upon them: But at length the *Romans*, partly by *Artifice*, and partly by *Force*, subdued this *Little Republick*, which proved too generous and open-hearted,

hearted, to subsist against the subtilties and clandestine frauds of the politick and ambitious Romans.

The Romans having rendred themselves Masters of Italy, Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, having carried their Victorious Ensigns into Illyricum, and triumphed over Carthage in the second Punick War; they seemed now qualified for any great Attempt, and to be able to carry every thing before them; their strength at Sea being as redoubtable as their Puissance by Land. When Ambition and Power concur in one, they either find or create Occasions whercon to work. The Grand Stratagem of the Romans, whereby to advance themselves, was this; To Contract an Alliance with all Petty Princes and States: to embolden them against their puissant Neighbours; and then by a feigned Generosity to undertake the Protection of their distressed Allies; whereby the Weak Ally became their Slave, and the Conquest of the Other added to the Riches and Puissance of the Republick. They drew all Controversies to their Cognizance; they interposed in all Quarrels, and thereby made themselves at first Arbitrators, then Lords of the Universe. To gain them a footing in Greece, they seek out the Ætolians, the veriest Rogues of all the Countrey, a people living upon Rapine, infamous for their Treachery and Baseness; with these Villains the Romans make a strict Confederacy; they promise to annex unto the Ætolians the Country of Acarnania, and to drive Philip of Macedon, with his Forces, out of their Territories; whose Arms these Free-Booters of Ætolia had drawn upon them. The Romans told their New Allies most plausible Stories concerning the Generosity of their State towards their Confederates, how they had incorporated some into their Republick, with all the Priviledges and Franchisements which themselves enjoyed: that others they so highly obliged, as to prefer the title of Their Friends and Associates before that of Citizens. The League being concluded, and a particular Article inserted, that neither should make Peace without the other; the Ætolians imbarque themselves in the War; but, being

Noster Populus
Sociis defenda-
dis terrarum
jam omnium
positus est. Ci-
cero.

Livy l. 26.
c. 24.

The History of the

but slenderly aided by the Romans, they are beaten, and enforced to submit on *hard Conditions*: the Romans draw advantage thence, and to defeat the Treaty of Peace send them *powerful Succours*; whereupon the *Ætolians* take courage, and frustrate all Endeavours of the *Mediators*. The *Achæans* and other adjacent *States* were jealous of the Consequences of this War, lest it should give the Romans opportunity to settle themselves in Greece; and knew not how to demean themselves betwixt two such *Potent States* as Rome and Macedonia: Their *Statists* varied in their *Judgments*; some preferred the Amity of the One, some of the other. But whilst the *alternate success* of the War seemed to ballance Affairs, they moved not, being content to see each weaken the other. After that the Victories of *Attilius* and *Flaminius* had reduced Philip and his *Macedonians* to a low condition, and that a great part of Greece confederated with the Romans, who then pretended they would restore the Liberty of Greece, the *Achæans* summoned a Council to debate of their Affairs: They had for their immediate Enemies the *Lacedemonians*, they suspected the power of the Romans, they had very great Obligations to the *Macedonian Kings*, and were *Confederates* with them; But they had some Quarrels with Philip, and beheld him as a Cruel and *Perfidious Prince*, and who would severely prosecute the Victory, should he happen to obtain it. The Romans sent *Embassadors* to the Assembly, and proffered to give them *Corinth* (then besieged) if they would joyn their Forces with those of the Romans, and their *Confederates*. Philip by his Agent solicites them either to adhere to him, or to remain *Neuters* during the War. *Aristenus* the State-holder perswaded them to prefer the Amity of the Romans; He exaggerated the strength of the Romans, and their success; He depressed the power of the *Macedonian*; He aggravated every Injury that Philip had done unto the *Achæans*, and expatiated into a General Character of his Evil Nature and Barbarity. He laid before them the danger of involving their Estate with the declining Fortunes of Philip;

United Provinces of Achaia.

7

Philip; the hazard of continuing Neuters; that the Romans proffered an Alliance; the question was, *Whether they should embrace it, or refuse their Friendship?* They would not acquiesce in a Neutrality: and must either be made effectually Friends or Enemies. The Council was divided in their Sentiments; some departed without declaring themselves; others had such a sense of the Favours they had formerly received from the Macedonians, that they could not assent to any League that was to their prejudice, or repugnant to that Amity which had been vowed and sworn to them. But at length the more pressing Counsels were embraced, as the most prudent and safe, if not generous. The Romans behaved themselves so at first, that they seemed to have no cause to repent them of their determination; a peace ensued thereon, and the Roman Consul at the Isthmian Games caused Proclamation to be made, That He restored to all Greece its intire Liberty. The People hereat were transported with Joy; they magnified the Vertue and Valour of the Romans, That ever there should be such a People in the World, that should submit themselves to all the Expences and Perils of a War, meerly to set others at liberty, and those not being of their Neighbours, but remote and distanced by great Seas: That they should overcome all these difficulties out of a generous Inclination to oblige Mankind, and to establish equitable Governments throughout the Earth. To set all Greece free at one Proclamation, none but the most elevate Spirits could design such a thing, nothing below the Vertue and Fortune of Rome could atchieve it. The Achæans had their Union augmented by the annexing of Corinth, Triphylia, and Herea, which the Macedonian had alienated: Nor did they a little rejoyce, when the Romans undertook a War against Nabis King of Sparta, for the Recovery of Argos, the Consul protesting that the Romans were no otherwise interessed in that War, than to compleat their Favours unto Greece, by restoring that City unto its Liberty. The Ætolians began to suspect the candour of the Romans, how speciously soever they concealed their intendments; they said, That *th^{at}* Ostenta-

Livy l. 34. c. 18

The History of the

tion of Liberty was vain insignificant, whilst the Roman Power continued in Greece; that Nabis and Argos were but prettexts assumed for the continuing of their Forces there. On the other side, the Achæans intreated the Romans that they would perfect their Glory by freeing Argos, and putting a restraint upon the Robbers of Ætolia. The Romans having procured the Argives their Liberty, and united them again to the Republick of Achæia, they withdrew all their Forces according as they had promised, thereby to vindicate their Honour before the whole World (as Flaminius said) and shew what Liers those Ætolians were, who had reported that 'twas indiscreetly done to put the whole power of Greece into the hands of the Romans, and to avoid the Government of Macedon, by subjecting themselves unto New Lords: He further admonished the Cities, That they would esteem of men by their performances, not words, and thence conclude whom to trust or distrust: That they would not abuse the Liberty given them, which would be the more durable, if more moderate: That they would preserve Amity with their Neighbours, and Justice within themselves: That by such a deportment they should be secure against the Enterprize of any Foreign Prince, or designs of ambitious Citizens: That Domestick Quarrels and Sedition gave opportunity to the Factions; and parties oppressed do more readily joyn with Foreigners, than yield to their fellow-Citizens: That they should so comport themselves in that Freedom given to them, that the Romans might never repent the Benefits they had conferred on Greece. The Achæans seemed to be most happy in their New Alliance; they had the Guardianship of the Seas, they had made a new Acquest of Lacedemon, and incorporated it with the rest of the United Cities: Whilst the Ætolians, the first and dear Allies of the Romans, were slighted by them in the conclusion of the War; and reaping no Benefit by their Friendship with Rome, they began to enter upon New Designs with King Antiochus.

This felicity of the Achæans was not advantagious to them; it was the first Step unto their ruine. They had brought Foreigners into their Territories, discovered
to

United Provinces of Achaia.

9

to them their *strength* and *weaknesses*, acquainted them with their *Armies*, *Councils*, and *Interests*; they had raised the Reputation of *Rome* to such an height, that all their *Citizens* were either amazed at its *puissance*, or dazzled with its *splendor*. They had ruined their *Old Neighbours*, deserted their *ancient* and *known Friends*, and without regard unto *Oaths* or *Obligations*, confederated with the *all-conquering Romans*. It was the undoubted Interest of *Greece* to oppose it self against the *growing Power* of the *Romans*; they and all *Asia* ought to have united against them, and not by making *separate Wars* at *sundry times*, to facilitate the general *Conquest*. The *Achaens* did all they could to prevent that destruction which they saw to be *unavoidable*: they shewed all possible *deference* unto the *Romans*; they rendred them all imaginable *Services*, not only in the War against *Philip*, but that other waged with King *Perseus*. Though *Antiochus* courted them to stand *Neuters*, and without hazarding themselves, to attend the issue of that War with an *entire strength*; yet were they so *fond*, or so *obsequious* towards their *New Allies*, that they assisted the *Romans* in overthrowing *Him*; and when the *Romans* had subdued *Him* and *Philip*, the *Boeotians* and *Aetolians*, they aided them in their War upon *Asia* against King *Antigonus*. The *Romans* had inveigled several other *Princes* to joyn their *Auxiliaries* with them, as the King of *Macedon*, of *Pergamus*, and *Bithinia*, telling them they needed not to fear the *Romans*, as *Enemies* to all *Kings* in general, or suspect they would ever impair their *strength* or *grandeur*; they shewed them the happy instances of such *Princes* they had much advanced; whilst *Antiochus* did in vain remonstrate that the *Romans* aimed at the *Universal Empire*, that none could be safe that lived near them, that it behoved all men to have a regard unto those raging *Fires* which consumed the dwellings of their *Neighbours*. These propheticall Remonstrances had no success: the *Achaens* were obstinately addicted to the *Roman Alliance*, and so tender in the preservation thereof, that by a publick *Edict* they prohibited any *Macedonian* to
come

The History of the

come into the Territories of *Achaia*, lest it should create a jealousy in their good Friends of *Rome*, to whom now they had enslaved themselves. Presently after the War with *Philip* was ended, they were convinced of the *Servitude* whereinto they had brought themselves: they durst not make War upon *Nabis*, but with the consent of the *Roman* Senate: and upon every occasion they were necessitated to send *Embassies* thither, and to depend on their advice: they durst not give audience to the Embassadors of *Antiochus* in their Assembly, but in the presence of their Consul. The *Romans* now had acquired that *puissance*, that the Aid of the *Achaens* was no longer requisite to them, and what had been hitherto the effect of an inviolate Friendship, must be continued out of Duty; there is no contesting of respects with the potent and ambitious; there is no allegation of merits and services unto them; their kindness must be owned as pure courtesy; and the Weaker must thank them as much as if they had given all they have not taken away. When *Antiochus* made War upon the *Romans*, the *Messenians* revolted from the *Achaens* to the *Aetolians*: after the War was ended, the *Achaens* endeavoured earnestly to bring them again into the Union, and made war upon them, when all gentle means failed. They finding themselves not able to resist, make applications to the *Roman* General, declaring that they would surrender their City into the hands and disposal of the *Romans*, but not unto the *Achaens*. He thereupon goes to the State-holder of the *Achaens*, and commands him to withdraw his Army from *Messene*; which when he had done with a ready Obedience, the *Roman* reproved him for attempting such a matter without his Leave and Authority, bad him to dismiss his Army, and call an Assembly of the States; that the *Messenians* should be re-united to *Achaia*; but if they had any Grievances, or needed any thing for their security, they should repair to Him at *Corinth*. The State-holder having summoned the Assembly, their Good Ally begins to expostulate with them about the Isle of *Zant*, which He said they detained unjustly: that They
were

were but *Auxiliaries* in the war against *Antiochus*; that the *Romans* were the *Principals* therein, and fought for *Themselves*, not for the *Achaens* at *Thermopylae*. Notwithstanding that *Diophanes* the *State-holder* shewed the Justice of *their Title*, and how it was fairly yielded to *them* by the *Enemy*, yet were they at last compelled to *This Resolution*, That they referred the whole *Affair* to the *Judgment* of *Quintius*: who gave them this *Civil Determination*: If he could believe that the possession of that *Island* would be of any real advantage unto the people of *Achaia*, he would immediately perswade the *Senate* and *People* of *Rome* to continue it unto so deserving *Allies*: but, as a *Tortoise* is then safe from all danger when she contracts her self within the *Covert* of her *Shell*; but whensoever she puts forth the head or legs, she exposeth her self to the hazard of every blow: So the *Achaens* being shut up by the sea within *Peloponnesus*, might easily secure their *Confines* and adjacent *Territories*, but if they did endeavour to extend their power into remote places, their new *Acquests* would but create them greater *Expence* and *Danger*, they being not defensible by reason of their distance. The *Assembly* acquiesced readily in this determination of the point, neither durst their *State-holder* *Diophanes* make any further opposition thereunto: whereupon the *Isle* of *Zant* was surrendred up to the *Romans*. This facility of the people might have obliged others of a more gentle Nature, and lesser *Designs*, unto some reciprocal kindness and acknowledgment: but the fierce and ambitious move not by those vulgar principles; in such, *Vertue* is not the *Rule* of their *Deportment* but as it is subservient to their purposes; and if their *Actions* be but *Great* and *Prosperous*, they will make *Themselves* to be confessed *Good* and *Generous*. The *Romans* drew advantages from this *Condescension* of theirs; and construing it to arise from fear, and a just sense of their weakness, they proceeded to intermeddle in the Government of the *Republick* it self, and to interpose upon Quarrels happening therein. The *Inhabitants* of *Aegium* repaired unto the *Roman Consul* with a *Complaint* against

The History of the

gainst the people of *Achaia*, for that their State-holder *Philopæmen* had removed the *General Assembly* (which had bin constantly held within their City) and decreed that it should not be fixed any longer in *one place*, but *successively* be held in each of the Confederate Cities: And whereas the *Adseffors* indicted a *Convention* at *Ægium*, caused them to meet at *Argos*: the *Generalty* submitting to the vwill of the *State-holder*, and the *Roman Consul*, though *He* came in favour of the *Ægians*, was enforced to repair unto *Argos*, vvhhere he found, upon Debate, that *Philopæmen* had the greatest Party; and all he did vvas to shew *how ready he should be to enterprize upon their Sovereignty*.

The *premises* one vvould think to be manifest Signs of that *servitude* vvhich the *Romans* purposed to introduce in *Achaia*. The *Romans* vvere present at, and took an account of their *publick Transactions*: The *Ackæans* vvere to make *War* and *Peace* as the *Romans* directed: The *Romans* made themselves *Arbitrators* in their *Domestick Quarrels*: The *Legates* from *Rome* acted vvhat they pleased amongst them, proceeding so far as to deprive them of vvhat they had *rightfully acquired in War*, and that by an Argument rather *facetious* than *strong*, but that a *Roman* urged it. But vvhat ensued did most effectually *demonstrate* the Intentions of their *Allies of Rome*.

The *Lacedemonians* had been ancient and bitter Enemies to the people of *Achaia*, but by the means of *Philopæmen* they vvere lately united to the *Republick of Achaia*, and made a part of *their Assembly*. It is more easie to procure *peace* than *amity*, to unite the Territories of *Cities*, than the Minds of the *Inhabitants*: VVhere *Enmity* is *inveterate*, all *Reconciliation* becomes *instable*; former *Feuds* and *Emulations* easily revive: Thus *some Acquests* do not augment but *impair* the strength of the *Empire*; and vvhat vvas intended by the *amicable Achæans* for mutual *Security* and *VVelfare*, the *factious Lacedemonians* turned to their *ruine*. Each party being *jealous* of the other, there could not be long vvanting an occasion of *Dispute*. The *Spartans* had

had proscribed some of *their Citizens* out of *their Confines*; these *Exiles* remained and were protected within certain Castles and Villages of *Laconia* which the *Romans* had annexed unto the *Jurisdiction* of *Achaia*; and which were situate betwixt the *Sea-coasts* and City of *Sparta*. The *Lacedemonians* did desire very much to re-gain their *Maritime Towns*, that they might have access to the Sea for *Exportation* and *Importation*, as also for the dispatching of *Embassadors* to manage *Leagues* at *Rome*, or elsewhere: To honest this Design of theirs, and to give some colour to the attempt, they pretended to seize upon those *Exiles*, as men proscribed by the State, and who by continuing in the *Voisinage* so near *their City*, did foment *divisions* and create *dangers* therein: And hereupon in the night the *Lacedemonians* surprized one of these *Sea-Ports*; but the Country taking the *Alarm*, and imbodying, they were driven out again the next day. The News of *this attempt* filled the *Exiles* with *terroure* and *suspicion*, and though the *present peril* was over, yet they and the rest of the *Inhabitants* determined to provide for their *future tranquility* by sending *Deputies* to *Achaia*, to relate what had happened, and to crave *their protection*. The *State-holder* for the time being, *Philopæmen*, having had a perpetual jealousy of the *Lacedemonians* lest they should grow too *potent*, and knowing with how much *difficulty* those are retained in an *equal condition* with others, who have been used to *command*, and preserve a *poinant sense* still of their former *Grandeur* and *Puissance*; He defended the Cause of the *Exiles*, and procured a Decree to be passed in the *General Assembly*, That the *Lacedemonians* should be deemed to have violated the *Union*, except they delivered up to punishment the *Authors* and *Contrivers* of that *Attempt*. And some *Officers* were sent to *Sparta* to demand them as *Prisoners*. The *Lacedemonians* were incensed at *this Decree*; they knew the extent thereof, if the *Criminals* came once to be inquired into; and to avoid the consequences thereof, they exaggerated to the *Populace* the *pride* and the *indignity* of the *Achéans* who had taken such

The History of the

a *Resolution* against their City, that by *such Union* there was not any *parity* established, but the *Spartans* were absolutely *enslaved*, the rest *combining* to depress them: Hereupon they determined to renounce the *Union* aforesaid, and to send *Deputies* to the *Romans* to surrender their City absolutely into *their power*: They saw their condition to be such, that they must be *subject* to some body; and it was most prudential to annex themselves to the *Greater Republick*, and which *practised* against that of *Achaia*, than to continue in League with the *Weaker*, and those so *treacherous Confederates*: They doubted not but the *ambitious Roman* would embrace *their protection*, and pardon the greatest faults in those which put themselves into *their tuition*; whereupon they put to death *thirty* of the Friends to *Philopæmen* and the *Exiles*; and immediately sent to *Fulvius* the *Roman Consul*, to come into *Peloponnesus*, and accept of their *Surrendry*. The *Acheans*, in prosecution of the former *Arrest*, and to avenge these *new Indignities*, declared War against the *Lacedemonians*; the notice whereof hastened the *Roman Consul* into *Peloponnesus*, where He interposeth betwixt the adverse parties, and artificially exasperateth both, by his ambiguous Speeches, against each other: Sometimes He shews himself *amicable* to the one, sometimes to the other, sometimes *haughtily* reproves them both, and at last concludes with this resolve, *That both Parties should refrain from Hostility until they had sent Embassadors to Rome, to know the pleasure of the Senate*. Hereupon both sides sent their Embassadors to *Rome*; but the *Acheans* had this disadvantage, that their *Commissioners* did not well agree in their Negotiation, or Sentiments concerning Affairs. The *Romans* seemed to have a very great esteem and honour for the Republick of *Achaia*; yet they did not think it suitable to *their ends*, that the Government of *Lacedemon* should be changed again, and the General *Union* consolidated: Wherefore they returned so intricate an Answer, that the *Acheans* thought the *whole matter* to be remitted unto them; and yet the *Lacedemonians* were persuaded

swaded that *there was much in reserve*. The *Achaens* formed an Army, and having encamped on the Borders of *Lacedemon*, they sent to demand those which had occasioned their Revolt from the *Union*, giving assurance that they should suffer no punishment but accordingly as upon a *fair Trial* they should be found *culpable*. But whilst they delayed their Answer, several of the *Exiles* who were in the Camp of the *Achaens* (exasperated through former injuries) fell upon the *Lacedemonians*, and slew *seventeen* of them; and afterwards *sixty three* of them being taken, were sentenced *judicially* to death by the *State-holder*. After this, the *Achaens* drove away the Authors of the *late Revolt*, took many *Slaves* and sold them, pull'd down the Walls of *Sparta*, restored the *exiled Persons*, and abrogated the Laws of *Lycurgus*.

Though this Action of the *Achaens* cannot be condemned of *Injustice*, yet it falls under the censure of *much imprudence*. The *Lacedemonians* had so great a Veneration for the Laws of *Lycurgus*, that they esteemed nothing more *sacred*: They were sensible that all their *ancient glory* and *felicity* proceeded from the observance of those *Constitutions*, and all their hopes of recovering their *pristine Honour*, or retaining their *present Dignity*, depended thereon: Their *high Spirits* could not endure this *alteration*, the calamity whereof was aggravated, in that it was done by the *Achaens*, a Republick over which their *Aneestors* had formerly triumphed, and given a *Government* unto, and from whom, as their *late Confederates*, they did not expect so *rigorous usage*. None are so impatient of Adversity as those which have known *great Prosperity*: Great Souls cannot endure *Servitude*, especially when they suffer under those whom they *contemn*; and they prefer a *subjection* to *Foreigners* before even an *equality of living* with *such persons*. 'Twas true, the *Achaens* needed not to fear any *Insurrections* from the *Spartans* alone; nor had they any other State in *Greece* to combine with for *their support*: But since the *Romans* were so *suspicious* an Ally, and did usually sacrifice all regards

The History of the

a Resolution against their City, that by *such Union* there was not any *parity* established, but the *Spartans* were absolutely *enslaved*, the rest *combining* to depress them: Hereupon they determined to renounce the *Union* aforesaid, and to send Deputies to the *Romans* to surrender their City absolutely into *their power*: They saw their condition to be such, that they must be *subject* to some body; and it was most prudential to annex themselves to the *Greater Republick*, and which *practised* against that of *Achaia*, than to continue in League with the *Weaker*, and those so *treacherous Confederates*: They doubted not but the *ambitious Roman* would embrace *their protection*, and pardon the greatest faults in those which put themselves into *their tuition*; whereupon they put to death *thirty* of the Friends to *Philopæmen* and the *Exiles*; and immediately sent to *Fulvius* the *Roman Consul*, to come into *Peloponnesus*, and accept of their *Surrendry*. The *Achaens*, in prosecution of the former *Arrest*, and to avenge these *new Indignities*, declared War against the *Lacedemonians*; the notice whereof hastened the *Roman Consul* into *Peloponnesus*, where He interposeth betwixt the adverse parties, and artificially exasperateth *both*, by his ambiguous Speeches, against each other: Sometimes He shews himself *amicable* to the *one*, sometimes to the *other*, sometimes *haughtily* reproves *them both*, and at last concludes with this resolve, *That both Parties should refrain from Hostility until they had sent Embassadors to Rome, to know the pleasure of the Senate*. Hereupon both sides sent their Embassadors to *Rome*; but the *Achaens* had this disadvantage, that their *Commissioners* did not well agree in their Negotiation, or Sentiments concerning Affairs. The *Romans* seemed to have a very great esteem and honour for the Republick of *Achaia*; yet they did not think it suitable to *their ends*, that the Government of *Lacedemon* should be changed again, and the General *Union* consolidated: Wherefore they returned so *intricate an Answer*, that the *Achaens* thought the *whole matter* to be *re-mitted* unto them; and yet the *Lacedemonians* were per-
swaded

swaded that *there was much in reserve*. The *Achaens* formed an Army, and having encamped on the Borders of *Lacedemon*, they sent to demand those which had occasioned their Revolt from the *Union*, giving assurance that they should suffer no punishment but accordingly as upon a *fair Trial* they should be found *culpable*. But whilst they delayed their Answer, several of the *Exiles* who were in the Camp of the *Achaens* (exasperated through former injuries) fell upon the *Lacedemonians*, and slew seventeen of them; and afterwards sixty three of them being taken, were sentenced *judicially* to death by the *State-holder*. After this, the *Achaens* drove away the Authors of the *late Revolt*, took many *Slaves* and sold them, pull'd down the Walls of *Sparta*, restored the *exiled Persons*, and abrogated the Laws of *Lycurgus*.

Though this Action of the *Achaens* cannot be condemned of *Injustice*, yet it falls under the censure of *much imprudence*. The *Lacedemonians* had so great a Veneration for the Laws of *Lycurgus*, that they esteemed nothing more *sacred*: They were sensible that all their *ancient glory* and *felicity* proceeded from the observance of those *Constitutions*, and all their hopes of recovering their *pristine Honour*, or retaining their *present Dignity*, depended thereon: Their *high Spirits* could not endure this *alteration*, the *calamity* whereof was aggravated, in that it was done by the *Achaens*, a Republick over which their *Aneestors* had formerly triumphed, and given a *Government* unto, and from whom, as their *late Confederates*, they did not expect so *rigorous usage*. None are so impatient of Adversity as those which have known *great Prosperity*: Great Souls cannot endure *Servitude*, especially when they suffer under those whom they *contemn*; and they prefer a *subjection* to *Foreigners* before even an *equality* of living with *such persons*. 'Twas true, the *Achaens* needed not to fear any *Insurrections* from the *Spartans* alone; nor had they any other State in *Greece* to combine with for *their support*: But since the *Romans* were so *suspicious* an Ally, and did usually sacrifice all regards

The History of the

to those of *Empire*; Since they did already enterprize upon the Sovereignty of *Achaia*; and drew the Cognizance of *their actions* to the Consuls and Senate of *Rome*; they ought to have demeaned themselves with *more caution*, and rather have abandoned *Sparta* to it self, (though it had remained a *continual* and *vexatious* but *weak* Enemy) then have driven *them* to have recourse to *Rome* for *protection*. The *Lacedemonians* were not less sensible of *their own Condition* than they were of that of the *Achaens*; they knew that the *Romans* contracted Alliance with that *Republick* out of Interest, to facilitate the overthrow of the *Macedonians*, their sole Competitors for the Dominion of *Greece*; that Leagues so founded, vary according as *Interests* do; that the *services* which the *Achaens* had rendred unto *Rome*, had lost their *Merit* and *Obligation* when the *Macedonian* was *totally overthrown*; and whatever *Honours* the Senate had conferred on the *Achaens* since, whatsoever *amity* was professed unto them, yet 'twas *incident to all power to fear rather than love those from whom it may receive a shock*; That they had just reason to apprehend lest the *Achaens* should at some time or other assume a concern for the *Honour and Liberty of Greece*. and make themselves head of a *League* to that purpose against *Rome*; That 'twas not consistent with the *Roman Grandeur* to persevere in an Alliance whereby the petty *Republick of Achaia* should treat on equal terms with *Rome*, and be intreated in such a manner as much more potent Kings did not pretend unto. Upon these *infallible Maxims of State*, the *Lacedemonians* presumed upon a kind reception at *Rome*, and dispatched *their Deputies* thither; they remonstrated there that the *Majesty and Authority* of the *Roman Senate* was contemned by the *Achaens*; that they acted *what they pleased*, and arrogated *what power they would*, over their *weak Neighbours and Confederates*; they represented the disasters of the *Spartans*, into *what* they were fallen, and from *what estate*: they made use of all *Arguments* that might work upon the *Pride, Jealousie, or Compassion* of the *Romans*: And the *Senate* who was ready to seek lesser causes

ses of Quarrels, listened hereunto with attention. The *Achaens* were necessitated to oppose an *Embassy* of theirs to that of the *Lacedemonians*, but they could not agree upon the *Instructions*: Some were for the *Deputies* to insist upon the Liberties of *Achaia*, that the *Republick* was *Sovereign* over its *Members*, that such Controversies as these ought to be determined by the *States General*; that when they embraced the *Alliance* of *Rome*, they did not subject themselves thereunto; that the Freedom of *Achaia* and of all *Greece* in general would be ruined, if they tamely submitted the actions of their *Republick* to be examined, debated and reversed by an Appeal to *Rome*. This was the opinion of such as were zealous for the Honour and Liberty of their Country; but others were so terrified with the Glory and Puissance of *Rome*, that they proposed more mild and submissive Counsels, that the *Achaens* ought by all possible deference to preserve a good correspondence with *Rome*, whose amity though it were not substantial or intire, yet the shew thereof was of great advantage to support the Honour and Interest of *Achaia* in *Greece*; that the Neighbouring States would despise and affront their small *Republick*, if once they saw that Friendship to decrease; that such opportunity ought not be given to those that envied their condition; nor ought they to incense the ambitious and proud *Romans* in this juncture, and draw upon themselves that power which they could not resist; that the poor and barren Country of *Lacedemon* was not worth the dispute; the accessional of Territory to the *Republick*, did not countervail the Expence, Trouble, and Danger with which it must be kept; that a moderate Greatness was most suitable to their Government, and to their present Interest; for by enlarging their Territories, and keeping Armies on foot, they would but multiply the fears of the *Romans*, and so accelerate their destruction: that 'twas inconsistent with the peaceable Maxims of their State, to retain these litigious Spartans within the Union, whence would arise a perpetual distraction in their Counsels, and divisions in their Assemblies: that the name of Liberty was

Sweet,

The History of the

sweet, and Souverainty a most agreeable thing; therefore their Counsels aimed at its preservation, which was best to be done now by condescension; that such an expedient might be found that the whole might seem an Act of their State, and not of the Roman Senate; and that, if the Achæans acquainted the Romans with the full Nature of their Union, and the Justness of their proceedings in conformity thereunto, and then left the Lacedemonians to the entire disposal of the Romans. Thus were the Achæans divided in their opinions; and these their Resentments being known at Rome, made the Senate jealous of the Achæans, lest they might take some seasonable occasion to become Enemies of the Roman Greatness; whereupon they fomented the Animosities betwixt the Lacedemonians and Achæans, till they became implacable against each other: they protracted the Debate, sometimes commiserating the Oppressed very much, sometimes gently arguing for the authority of the General Assembly and State-holder of Achaia: They blamed the factiousness and obstinacy of the Spartans; then they reprehended the passion and severity of the Achæans; and at length plainly undertook the defence of the Spartans against their good Allies of Achaia, sending them word sometimes that the Senate did not approve their actions; sometimes that they ought to make amends for their defaults: And finding that a great Party of the Achæans (some out of love, some out of fear) did adhere to the Romans, they thought it necessary to nourish those dissensions, by sending frequent Embassies into the Country; whereupon they tell them, That they ought to take care that the Embassadors of Rome might always have free access to their States General, as the Achæans should have to their Senate. It is true that the Achæans did retain still some generous thoughts; and had the boldness to deny Cæcilius the freedom of coming to the General Assembly, because he did not communicate his Message to the State-holder first: It is true, Lycortas the State-holder told the Roman Embassador Appius Claudius, who was sent to examine things, That the Achæans had indeed the Romans in great

vene-

reueration, and (if they please to have it so) stood in great fear of them, but they did more reuerence and fear the Immortal Gods. Also, That the Achæans were indeed the Allies of Rome, but they did not by the Confederacy surrender up the Sovereignty of their Republick; they were still free, and were no more obliged to render an account of their actions unto the Romans, than the Romans were unto them. In fine, the amity was contracted upon equal terms, neither were they thereby become the Subjects of Rome: But Appius Claudius, being a fierce Man, replied confidently, That he should advise his good Friends of Achaia, that they would by a ready compliance make a courtesie of their Obedience; that they should do ill to deny the Requests of such as were able to compel them. These last words extorted an universal sigh from the Hearers; but withal imprinted such a terror in them, that they determined to obey the Resolves of the Senate; and such Decrees were passed as favoured the Spartans in general, and in particular those of them whom the Achæans had banished the Countrey. The Spartans were continued as a part of the Republick of Achaia, but with some Immunities which were repugnant to the Laws of the Union; the Exiles were restored to their Possessions; the which Obligations they derived from the Romans not Achæans: And upon pretence of avoiding future Contests, the cognizance of the most important Cases emerging, was reserved unto the Romans, ordinary matters might be transacted by the Spartans and Assembly of the Achæans: And further to weaken the Republick, the Romans declared it to be at the choice of any of the Confederates to persist in or relinquish the Union. Whereupon some of the United Cities began to design a Revolt, and to dread a Confederacy whereunto the Romans appeared no longer Friends: The Messenians began first to fall off; and renounced the General Assembly of Achaia, slaying the State holder; and though the Romans were obliged by their League to assist the Commonwealth of Achaia against all its Enemies; at least, not to aid them with Ammunition and Corn out of Italy; yet did they

The History of the

they no ways interest themselves in the War, nor would they seem to condemn the *Revolt* of the *Messenians*.

Behold to what a degree of *misery* this *Republick* brought it self by its *intestine dissentions* and *animosities* ! When fear had once seized their minds, they apprehending nothing so much as the Puissance of the victorious *Roman*, and all relief was impossible unto them who had abandoned their old Friends of *Macedonia* to contract this *pernicious Alliance* with the most powerful State of *Rome*. Such were now their *Resentments*, that every man strove to shew his devotion to the prevailing *Roman* : If there were any *Patriots* left, they did but exasperate the *Senate*, and add to the domestic *Discord* by their *unseasonable refractoriness* : It now seemed *prudential* for them to expedite their *Slavery*, that they might procure the better conditions. The *Romans* understood the artifice, and made use of it to compleat their ruine : Thus that deportment which obligeth a generous *Virtue*, doth work contrary effects in the *Ambitious*. All great Cases were decided at *Rome* ; thither were frequent *Appeals* made ; thence came very *imperious Answers* oftentimes : So that there remained onely a shadow of the *Supreme Power* in the *States General* and the *State-holder*, the Substance was in the *Roman Senate* : And when the people saw to whom the most effectual applications were made, they ran into *Parties*, and when there was any competition betwixt the *Interests* of their *Native Country*, and those of *Rome*, those that could best reward and punish, had the preference in their affections. The perpetual dissentions at home, the terrours from abroad, the helpless condition of a broken Government, made every man indifferent, or despair thereof. The *Supreme Officers* of *State*, even the *State-holders* were no longer chosen for their *Merits* and *Fidelity* to their *Country*, but accordingly as they were devoted unto the *Romans*, and were recommended by them. None that were faithful to the *Republick* were to be elected, lest the *Romans* should grow jealous thereof : The *Romans* could menace them, and say, They knew very well who were well-affected unto them ; and were

well

well pleased to see their *Adherents* signally to *distinguish themselves* from the *adverse party*. There is no greater or more sure prognostick of approaching destruction, than when *the Subjects of one State dare avow their concernments for another; and the Foreigner can boast of and number his Creatures there.*

Whilst the Affairs of *Achaia* were in this troublesome and dangerous posture, there happened an occasion for *them* to regain their *former Liberty*; but the State-holder, and too many others were so *devoted* to their *Great Allies* of *Rome*, and did so magnifie the advantages of their *friendship*, and the dangers imminent from their *enmity*, that they lost this *last and happy opportunity*. *Perseus* King of *Macedonia* had recollected the *Spirits of the Macedonians*, which the *Romans* had broken by vanquishing his Father *Philip*; and having formed such a strength as might alone dispute the *Sovereignty of Greece* with the *Romans*, he animated the several *Republicks* to assert their common *Liberties*, and joynly to recover that *Glory* which their *Countrey* had lost by pursuing of *private and separate Ends*: He made particular overtures to the *Achaens*, and desired they would lay aside all *enmity* against him, and forbear those *Jealousies* which had been so destructive to *Greece*; that they would no longer remember the *Injuries* his *Father* did them, nor think Him to have succeeded *Philip* in his *Passions* as well as *Kingdoms*: the flourishing Estate of the Realm *was* indeed such that it transported the *Macedonians* to a design of enlarging their Bounds by the *Universal Conquest of Greece*; but they were now reduced to other terms, and enforced to contrive now *their own safety* instead of the *Ruine* of their *Neighbours*: that the same *motives* which induced *them* to renounce the *ancient amity* contracted with the *Macedonians*, ought to prevail much more with them to abandon this *new and perilous Confederacy* with the *imperious Romans*. Some there were who thought the Proposition reasonable; others suggested a *Neutrality*, and that the *Achaens* should assist neither *Rome* nor *Macedon* in the War, but form their

The History of the

councils according to the event of things; since by taking either side they should draw upon them the indignation of the other, and render *their Ally* if victorious, *too powerful*. But those which favoured the *Romans* did overrule the rest, so that all *audiance* was refused unto *Perfius*, and 'twas resolved effectively to assist the *Romans*, of whom they now stood in so great aw, that they were extremely perplexed lest the *Senate* should know that such points had ever been debated in the *General Assembly*. Within four years the *Romans* did totally subdue the *Macedonians*, and reduced the *Kingdom* into a *Province*, the *Achaens* heartily *congratulating* them for these victories which they had helped to atchieve; and receiving from the *Senate* the publick thanks and praises due to so *faithful Confederates*. The whole world stood amazed at this prodigious success of the *Romans*, and yielded generally to that *power* which they saw to be *irresistable*: nor did men less admire the counsels and maxims by which the *Republick* of *Achaia* had steered in that juncture, since that they could not expect to subsist long in their present condition; for insatiate *ambition* distinguisheth not betwixt *friends* and *foes*, and despiseth the vulgar *niceties* as obstacles to *Empire*. There being nothing of force in *Greece* to check the *Roman Arms*, nor any powerful *Confederate* to be sought unto after the conquest of *Macedonia*, the *Romans* left off their former *artifices*, and clandestine practices upon the *Republick* of *Achaia*, and began openly to manifest their intentions. The *Senate* drew to its cognisance those causes which usually were decided in the generall Assembly of the *Amphictyones*: that *Council* or *Diet* received the complaints of the several States and Principalities of *Greece*; the proud *Roman* thought that *shadow* of *Sovereignty* and *Union* might in time prejudice his Affairs, and facilitate some *League* against the *new Conquerour*: several of the best and wisest in *Achaia* were sent for to *Rome*, and falsely traduced to have privately favoured the unfortunate *Macedonian*, and *without hearing* they were condemned to perpetual imprisonment in *Tuscany*. The

Achaens

United Provinces of Achaia.

23

Acheans thereupon found the falsehood of the measure^s which they had taken, and that *their Liberty* was absolutely overthrown, nor could they tell which way to avenge themselves, or prevent the evils that threatened them: They sent sundry *Embassies* to *Rome*, desiring that those which were committed might be brought to a publick trial, either at *Rome*, or before their *Superiors* in *Achaia*: but all these solicitations proved vain and ineffectual, the *Romans* proceeding to tell them, that *they were dangerous persons*, and *not to be trusted at home*, and that the *Acheans* themselves seemed to have *this opinion* of them, when *they* sent them prisoners unto *Rome*: that the *Senate* would never detain them, but for the *welfare* of *Achaia*, which would be embroiled should these *angry* and *enterprising* persons return thereto. After seventeen years of importunity, when the *principal* and *most active* men were *dead*, and the rest become *dispirited* by their sufferings, and their interest lost by so *tedious imprisonment* and *absence*, about *three hundred* of them were released: In the mean time, the *Romans* had caused the *Acheans* to renounce the *ancient alliances* which their *Republick* had with the Kings of *Ægypt*, and people of *Rhodes*: they animated the *Ætolians* to fall off from the *Union* of *Achaia* and defended them *therein*: they set on foot the *old contentions* betwixt the *Spartans* and *Acheans*, and having thus distracted that *Republick*, and incensed the respective members thereof one against the other, they caused a *General Assembly* to be held at *Corinth*, where the *Roman* *Embassadors* endeavoured effectually to persuade the *States General*, that it was most expedient for *them* to dissolve the *Union*, and each *City* *separately* to dispose of its own *Sovereignty*, and manage its affairs by independent *Officers* and *Laws*. The people of *Corinth* hearing *this*, rose in a tumult, and slew several *strangers* that were in the *Town*, and put some affronts upon the *Roman* *Embassadors*. Hereupon the *Senate* complained of the *Acheans*, that the *Majesty* of the people

The History of the

of Rome was injured by the contumelious usage of their *Embassadors* : and a war ensued, which terminated in the desolation of *Achaia*, and the burning of *Corinth* : The *States General* being dissolved, and the vanquished *Acheans* sold for *slaves* by their friends of Rome, that they might the more sensibly understand to what condition they reduce themselves, who make their neighbours too great, and put themselves into their mercy by overthrowing that power which should be the counterpoise.

The ruine of this *Common-wealth* hath given occasion to sundry Writers of *Politics*, as *Polybius* and *Jacobus Gothofredus*, to condemn their proceedings. The success of humane affairs is so various, and wars are managed with such uncertainty, and such circumstances do oftentimes befall *Republicks* that 'tis not in their power to pursue the most safe counsels, and sometimes an high, though no assured hope ought to be preferred before the more cautious, if more humble thoughts. It is easie to determine the immediate causes of the subversion of that *Republick*; but if the wisest of those which condemn their *League* with Rome, had lived in those daies, and were to form their counsels upon the posture affairs were then in, and not upon that prospect which un-concerned posterity hath thereof, perhaps they would have embraced those resolutions which they now reprove.

The *Acheans* had indeed a very ancient *League* with the *Macedonians*, they were of the same Continent, and as it were of the same Language and Consanguinity: they had received many benefits by the *Macedonian* amity, and *Philip* himself had aided them against their Enemies of *Lacedaemon*. But this amity with *Philip* had very many circumstances whereupon it might be questioned for the future. For the *Macedonians* were a warlike people, of great strength, famed for their invincible *Militia*, they had long aimed at the *Universal Monarchy* of Greece, they had now extended their conquests far into *Thracia*, and had subdued in a manner all Greece, but *Peloponnesus*: the sense
of

United Provinces of Achaia.

25

of those Benefits which the *Achaëans* had received from the *Macedonians*, was much effaced by the late deportment of *Philip*, who had not only dilated his Acquests unto their *Confines*, (belieging *Athens*, and oppressing the sturdy *Ætolians*) but aided *them* against *Lacedemon* with so slender Forces as if he intended not the preservation and welfare of his *Allies*, but by such artifices to reduce all *Peloponnesus* under his subjection at last. These things duly considered, it may seem to have been well done of the *Achaëans* to call in the *Romans*, and to prevent their apparent Ruine by joyning with a *Foreigner*, whose strength might counterpoise that of *Philip*, and bring them less of terrour, since the remoteness of *Italy*, the Contingencies of War by Sea and Land, the puissance of *Macedonia*, might bring both Parties into such a condition as not to be able to molest or invade the peaceable Neighbourhood. The effects of these Counsels proved happy at first, for immediately *Philip* courted their Friendship, restoring them some Towns which he detained from them; their coldness towards the *Macedonians* had emboldened the *Romans* to begin a War, which by reason of the other with *Hannibal*, they could not well prosecute: So that the *Achaëans* had, without Expence or Trouble, abated much of the pride and ambition of *Philip*.

After that the *Romans* had put an happy end to the Second War with *Carthage*, they began to cast a jealous Eye upon the *Macedonian* Empire: they saw their *Allies* of *Ætolia* subdued by *Philip*, and the Cities of *Asia* ready to contract a Defensive League against *them*. The *Consuls* animated the *Senate* and *People* to invade *Macedonia*, shewing the intrinsic power of that Kingdom, the Alliances with which it was fortified; how easie it would be for *Philip* to attempt *Italy*, as *Pyrrhus* had done; how prone men were, after they had provided against known Dangers, to pursue unknown Hopes, and not to stop where they begun. The War being resolved upon, they sent to sollicite the several Cities and Republicks of *Greece* to joyn with them against *Philip*; and after they had given a Reputation to their Arms by some Exploits

The History of the

Exploits against the *Macedonians*, they send their *Embassadors*, and withal their *Fleet*, unto *Achaia*, offering them a *perfect amity* if they would *actually* joyn with them, but would not acquiesce in any *Neutrality*. Hereupon the *States General* were perplexed, they saw those *Naval Forces* on their Coast which were able to vanquish them before they could receive any assistance from *Macedonia*; the *goodness of their Ports* did but facilitate their *Conquest*, since the *Romans* were *Masters at Sea*. They must either draw the War upon themselves, who were not able to undergo it, or transfer it into *Macedonia*. Their Condition admitted of no *middle Counsels*, and of the *Extreams* the latter was the best. The *miscarriages* of *Philip* in the beginning of the War, as to *Conduct* and *Valour*, made them see which side had the advantage of the other: and they had reason to confederate with those who were then able to *distress them*, and would in the end bear away the *Victory*. By preserving their Country *entire* at present, and contributing onely a *part* of their strength to the aid of the *Romans*, they should still be in a posture considerable to mediate *in time* for a *peace*, and render other courtesies to the *Macedonians*, the depressing of whose *puissance* was become their *present Interest*, as it would be their *future* to rescue it from *utter ruine*.

Hitherto the Counsels of *Achaia* seemed prudential; the *Macedonians* were reduced to their ancient Confines, all *Greece* was restored to its *Pristine Liberty*; nothing accrued to the *Romans* by this War, but the *Glory* of having delivered *Greece*, and weakened the Realm of *Macedonia* that it was no longer formidable to its *Neighbours*. But the *Romans* had further ends, and made use of that *specious Generosity* onely to insinuate themselves into the affection of the credulous *Greeks*, who neither understood how hard a thing it was for a *City* to preserve its *Liberty* after it hath recovered it; nor how it was impossible for *Greece* to unite for the general Defence, when they were *cantonized* into so many petty *Republicks*. The *Achaens* were become the most united and potent Republick in *Greece*; they had powerfully

erfully interceded for their Neighbours of *Boetia*, and obliged the *Romans* to compose the general Affairs of *Greece* by a Peace with *Philip*. It behoved the *Romans* therefore by all artifices to divide and weaken the authority of that Republick; the which they effected in such manner, that when *Perseus* the Son of *Philip* had settled his Kingdom, accumulated great Riches, and disciplined his *Militia*, and put himself into a condition to dispute again the Fortunes of *Greece*, should *Rome* attack it; the *Acheans* had not the Resolution to embrace his Friendship, and concur with those of *Rhodes*, and others, to uphold the Liberty of *Greece* by an equal counterpoise of those two Powers; but chuse to adhere unto their League with the *Romans*, though after the subversion of *Perseus*, they must be at the discretion of their Victorious Ally. Had the case been to be resolved by the Modern Policies of *Europe*, they had not fallen into this Error. For the Law of Nations is now reconciled to that of Nature, which knows no consideration superior to that of Self-preservation: to preserve the Neighbouring Powers equally ballanced, 'tis esteemed lawful and wise to change Alliances, according as either side declines. This hath been the constant practise of *England*, *France*, and *Italy*. How often do we find the Pope and *Venetians* to change sides during the Wars betwixt *Francis* the First, and *Charles* the Fifth in *Italy*? Thus *Lewis* XII. and *Maximilian*, and *Ferdinand*, together with Pope *Julius*, combined in the League of *Cambrai* to abate the growing Power of the *Venetian* Republick, which seemed to aim at the Sovereignty of *Italy*: And afterwards *Ferdinand* and *Julius* associated with the *Venetians* and K. *Henry* VIII. to balance the power of *France*, whose Victories in *Millan* and the *Venetian* Territories, created new fears in them. No sooner had *Charles* the VIII. by an unexpected Success conquered the Kingdom of *Naples*, but the *Venetians*, the D. of *Millain*, and all the Potentates of *Italy*, (who had either accepted a Neutrality, or actually joyn'd in the assistance of *Charles*) grew jealous thereat, and changed their Counsels

Councils, forming a League to expel the French out of Italy; preferring the general respect unto their Security (though against a confederate Prince) before any obligation of Leagues and Promises. But the Achæans either were too plain and simple to comprehend these things, or of too strict Justice to admit the Suggestion. They could not believe those Maxims, That the Honour of Statesmen ought to be spun out of course Cloth; That the Heroical Characters of Virtue were onely to be found in the Discourses of Philosophers; being more spoken of, than practised, by the generous Roman. They had not met with those Oracles which the Lawyers and Politicians suggested unto Queen Elizabeth upon another occasion, viz. "All Contracts with a Prince are understood to admit an interpretation of sincere Fidelity; neither is a Prince bound by his Contract, when for just cause the Contract turneth to the Publick Detriment. The Peace is not broken, if a Prince go back from his Contract, when it is done by accident of a new Case, or when the matter cometh to a new Case, concerning which other provision would have been made, if it had been thought upon. Leagues and Contracts of Princes ought not to be cavilled, neither ought to be observed to them that break Contracts. A Prince is not bound to a Contract solemnly made in a cause respecting his State, if it tend to the prejudice and detriment of his Subjects. Every Contract, though sworn, is understood if matters continue in the same state, but not if they be changed. A man is bound more strongly to the Commonwealth, than to his own Promise. And out of the Authority of Seneca, A wise man doth not change his determination, all things continuing which were when he took it: therefore he never repenteth him because no better thing at that time could be done, than was done, no better thing ordained than was ordained. The Stateholder of Achæia had not such of his Council as were of the Cabinet to Henry IV. when he violated his Faith given to Q. Elizabeth A. D. 1598. There had been a Contract made betwixt those two Princes at Millan, A. D. 1592. under their Hands and Seals, bona fide, and in the word of Prin-

Cambden Hist
of Q. Eliz. ad
Anno 1595. &
Zouch de jure
feciali, part 2.
sect 4.
Alber. Genti-
lis de jure belli,
l. 3. c. 14.

Seneca de be-
neficiis, l. 4.
24.

ces, that with joynt forces they should make a war offensive and defensive against the Spaniard, as long as he should make war with either of them, and should enter into no peace with him, without mutual consent betwixt them, and both of them to be comprehended in the Peace. The same League was renewed betwixt them in 1596. and it was exprelly covenanted again, that neither the King nor Queen shall treat of any Peace or Truce without the consent of each other. The Dutch were comprehended as Allies in the same League; yet Henry the fourth having attained the Kingdom, dissipated those of the League, and reduced almost all places appertaining to the Crown under his obedience, he determined to treat alone with the Spaniard, and, if he might have the remaining Towns surrendered up to him, to purchase those advantages with ease, and to establish the affairs of his Kingdom by infringing his royal word. The Dutch and English sent their Embassadors to dissuade him from those purposes: Oldenbarnevelt remonstrated, That the Estates case was by Gods mercy, and the Queens favour and assistance brought to that pass, that they had been able not only to defend themselves, but also to aid France in her extremities. Then, how earnestly the French King had desired the League of offense and defence with them, which they had willingly contracted for the Queen's sake, not once thinking that so great a King would ever have a thought of breaking the same League. — He appealed to the French Kings conscience before God, whether it were honorable for the King to separate his cause from them, to whom He had joyned himself with so great obtestations, when they had given no cause of separation. He concluded (after many reasons why they could not embrace peace with the Spaniard) that some Kings to attain power, had neglected Leagues, but for the most part with sad event. For the State of Kings, unless it stand in fidelity cannot subsist in power. Sir Robert Cecil put the King in mind with what vows he had bound himself lately before the Earl of Shrewsbury after the ratification

Camden hist. of Q. Eliz. ad an. 1591.

Id. ibid, ad ann. 1596.

Id. ibid. ad an, 1598. Grotius Hist. Belg. l. 7.

The History of the

tification of the League, and before, by many Letters signed with his *own hand*. And he stuck not to affirm that the *Queen* had not offended at all against the Conditions of the League; yea that she had performed more; *but the King had observed nothing*; and withall he drew forth the *Instruments of the League*. He also modestly put *Him* in mind that some course might be taken, whereby those great sums of money formerly lent, might be paid unto the *Queen*, who being now *forsaken*, had learned *too late*, to provide *more carefully* for her own State in time to come, and not bestow her Benefits on *ill Deservers*. King Henry the Fourth dismissed *them* with *gentle Answers*, and acknowledged the *Queens* most *ample Benefits* towards *Him*, promising *that there was nothing which for her sake he would not most affectionately do*. But yet He concluded the *Peace* (She and the *Dutch* being excluded) and excused himself in words to this effect: *Although the Queen have begun a War against the Spaniard, and that with Honour, and hath hitherto continued it with happy success: yet if she will not enter into another manner of War, the lesser Wealth must of necessity at the length yield to the greater. For my part, though having been bred up in Arms, I am taken with the love of Wars above all others: Yet seeing I am a King, and have People under my Government, there is a Conscience to be made of exposing my people to the fury of the Wars; and it were a foul sin, if in an irreligious ambition I should, to mine own detriment, and the detriment of my Confederates, refuse peace when it is offered, when it cannot be redeemed without Blood, and grossly neglect the People committed unto me.*

The whole Story is *too long* to be transcribed out of *Cambden, Grotius, and Reidanus, &c.* but if the *Acheans* had been so fortunate as to have prognosticated what *Posterity* would think to be *equitable, prudent, and consonant to the Law of Nations*, or had for their *Counsellors* those which understood as much, *Sully, Villeroy, and Jannin*, they had never lain so *ignominiously* under the power of the *Romans*. They would

Henricus 3.
pacem facti in
necessitate ex-
cusavit. Ne-
quivisse se sine
eterna subdito-
rum exprobra-
tione, honestis-
simas conditio-
nes rejicere:
quando tristis
regni status pa-
cem atque oti-
um posceret. --
Reidanus an-
nal. Belg. 1.
A. D.
1588.

would have moved in *that juncture* by so flexible *Maxims of State*, that they could not have been *fooled into their ruine* by the Romans; nor have been *obnoxious* to the *inconstancy, revenge, or ambition* of *Perseus K. of Macedonia*. But they moving by such Principles as their potent *Allies* did not admit of (except it were upon prospect of greater advantages) the issue of their *demeanour* hath left unto this Age a durable monument of *State-folly*, and to the *Virtuosi* a Noble and *Luciferous Experiment* how to make *Corinthian Brass*, whensoever there shall be another *Achaia*, another *Corinth*, and another *Rome*.

I might adde to this History of *Achaia*, another of *Rhodes* which was parallel thereunto: 'twas briefly thus. The Commonwealth of *Rhodes* being situated in an *Island*, had derived those Advantages from the frequent Troubles and Revolutions of *Greece* to acquire a great *Trade* and *Naval Strength*: they were very expert in *Navigation*, and were in a manner *Lords of the Neighbouring Seas*. Such was their *fame* and *puissance*, that the *Laws of Oleron* were never in such esteem as the *maritime Constitutions* of the *Rhodians*. When the great power of *Antiochus* in *Asia* made them jealous lest he should attempt upon their *Liberty*, or at least deprive them of the *Dominion of the Sea*, they thought it *Policy* to combine with the remote Forces of *Rome*, to depress the power of their Neighbour. They convoyed the Romans into *Asia*, they instructed them with the *Sea-coasts*, the Arts of *Navigating* and *fishing at Sea*. Before that time the Romans knew not how to manage a *Sea-fight*, they had *Ships* and *Courage*, but understood not the Arts and *Stratagems* of *Sea fights*. The *Rhodians* beat *Hannibal* in a *Sea-fight* for them; and when the indiscretion of the *Roman Prætor* had almost ruined their Fleet at *Myonessus*, the *Rhodians* by their *valour* and *dexterity* recovered the day. The Romans never atchieved any great Exploit at Sea without the aid and assistance of the *Rhodians*; but the *Rhodians* gained sundry *Victories* without them. The Romans rewarded their services with the donation of several rich Territories, which were adjacent to them upon the Continent. But when the power of *Rome* had settled it self in *Greece* and *Asia*, and that there was no counterpoise for their *Puissance* but *Perseus* of *Macedon*: They began to suspect their Great Allies, and admitted of an Embassy from *Perseus*; some of their Senate did animate them to interpose for *Perseus*, and to declare War against those that should refuse a Peace; they shewed the excessive Greatness of *Rome*, their increase of Shipping

Shipping and able Seamen, the Ports, the Traffick, the Armies, the Alliances which they had in the Neighbourhood: that the liberty, trade, and dominion of the Sea, which the Rhodians then enjoyed, were in danger, and continued only by the indulgence of those whom their Alliance had made too Great. Hereupon they did dispatch an *Embassy* to Rome, shewing that the *Macedonian War* would bring so great an interruption to their *Commerce*, that the *Rhodians* must have a regard to the *Peace*, and should be put upon *New Debates about their proper Interest, in opposition to those that rejected their Mediation.* The Senate received this Message with *indignation*, and knowing that their strength at Sea was become such that they needed not the assistance or advise of the *Rhodians*, they immediately deprived them of all they held in the *Terra firma*, and slighted all their subsequent Applications and *tenders of aid*: When that *Perseus* was subdued, the *Rhodians* sent *Embassadors* to congratulate the Senate for the *success*; but they were not received with the least *solemnity*, but inforced to go in mourning from door to door, to beg the favour of each Senator towards their *poor Commonwealth*, against which the *Romans* were so incensed. But no *Prayers* or *Tears* could prevail with their *proud Ally*: A War was decreed against *Rhodes*, and their *destruction* resolved upon. The *Rhodians* were extremely perplexed at this news: those which had advised them to interpose betwixt the *Macedonians* and *Romans*, were forced to fly, or kill themselves, or sent *Prisoners* to Rome: and if nothing would mitigate the anger of the *Romans*, they determined to imbarke all their People, and sail to Rome, and there prostrate themselves before the Senate, either to be *absolved* or *put to death*, as they pleased. After great Submission and Importunity, their *Embassadors* prevailed to stop the War. And because they had acted the *Mediators*, the Senate resolved that the *Rhodians* should neither be esteemed *Friends* nor *Enemies* of Rome. They were reduced to the narrow Confiners of their own Island, and their Trade so impoverished, that their Naval Strength and Power declined therevith, and the *Romans* managed the *Dominion of the Sea*, according to the *Laws of Rhodes*.

F I N I S.

REPRODUCED FROM THE COPY IN THE
HENRY E. HUNTINGTON LIBRARY

FOR REFERENCE ONLY. NOT FOR REPRODUCTION